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comparative analysis of the experiences of emerging market economies in Asian and Latin
America during the period 1985-2000. It is found that the degree of appreciation in RER
associated with capital inflow is uniformly much higher in Latin American countries compared to
their Asian counterparts, despite the fact that the latter experienced far greater foreign capital
inflows relative to the size of the economy. The econometric evidence suggests that both the
composition of capital flows and differences in the degree of response of RER to capital flows
matter in explaining these contrasting experiences. While RER appreciation is a phenomenon
predominantly associated with other (non-FDI) forms of capital inflows (OCFW), a given level
of OCFW brings about a far greater degree of appreciation of the real exchange rate in Latin
America where the importance of these flows in total capital inflow is also far greater. On the
policy front, Asian countries seem to have used fiscal contraction and nominal exchange rate
adjustment more effectively to cushion the RER against the appreciation pressure of capital
inflows. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that sterilized intervention can generate a
lasting impact on the real exchange rate.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The string of financial crises in emerging-market economies in the 1990s and the global
reverberations that followed them have added new impetus to the debate on how to
reconcile international capital mobility with domestic economic stability and
developmental priorities in investment receiving developing countries. The unqualified
enthusiasm for promoting capital flows to aid economic advancement in these countries
has given way to a new emphasis on finding ways and means of ameliorating unfavorable
side effects of ‘too much’ capital inflow. At the center of this debate is what Corden
(1994, p. 8) calls the ‘real exchange rate problem’the possibility that capital inflows
bring about an appreciation of the real exchange rate (the relative price of traded to non-
traded goods) with adverse affects on traded-goods production in the domestic economy. 
If a country relies on foreign capital (or any other inward transfer) to maintain
high levels of domestic absorption, it is natural for the real exchange rate to appreciate,
regardless of the exchange rate regime. The increased spending on traded goods will be
accommodated through an increase in the trade deficit with no adverse impact on the real
exchange rate. By contrast the excess demand on non-traded goods will result in an
increase in the price of these goods relative to that of traded goods.  This price adjustment
occurs either through an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate under a floating
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exchange rate system or through an increase in nominal prices of non-traded goods in a
fixed exchange rate regime, or through a mixture of the two processes in an intermediate
(fixed-but-adjustable) regime. But the problem with this natural (equilibrium)
phenomenon is that capital inflows may well be temporary, and hence in due course real
depreciation is likely, which may require a painful and politically unpalatable economic
adjustment. At the same time, capital inflow-induced real appreciation can have adverse
impact on economic adjustment during the boom period, hampering the country’s ability
to face such an eventuality.  It tends to discourage traded-good sectors, divert resources to
over-consumption or investment in low yielding non-tradable goods sectors. Moreover
persistent real appreciation could well set the stage for a speculative attack on the
national currency, putting an end to the very economic boom fueled by capital inflows.1
There is a sizable literature on the patterns and determinants of capital
flows to Asia and Latin America and problems of macroeconomic management in the
context of increased capital mobility.2 However to our knowledge there has not been any
systematic comparative analysis of the nexus of real exchange rate and capital flows
encompassing countries in the two regions. The general perception in the literature is that
the East Asian countries have done fairly well in absorbing capital inflows without a
seriously damaging impact on economic performance operating though real exchange
rate appreciation. However, there is a number of important issues yet to be answered
relating to the comparative performance of these countries to inform the on-going debate.
Can the observed greater susceptibility of the real exchange rate in Latin American
countries to capital inflows be explained in terms of differences in policy responses
alone? If so what are these policies? Are there some region-specific factors (rooted in the
macroeconomic policy history, for example), which make Latin American countries more
vulnerable to real appreciation associated with a given level of capital inflow? Does the
1 In the recent literature on currency crises, persistent appreciation of the real exchange rate
(adjusted for fundamentals) has been identified as a major factor in setting the scene for a crisis.
This is because a persistent real appreciation implies that economic fundamentals of the country
may not permit the authorities to defend the currency successfully in the event of a speculative
attack. (Kaminsky et al. 1997, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 1995).
2 See for instance Calvo et al. (1994 and 1996), Gavin et al. (1996), Corbo and Hernadez (2000),
Dornbusch and and Werner (1996), Edwards 2000, Ito (2000), Larian (2000) and Fernandez and
Montiel (2000). 
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composition of capital inflows matter? In particular, is foreign direct investment different
from other capital inflows in its impact on the real exchange rate? 
This paper aims to examine these and related issues through a comparative
analysis of the experiences of eight Asian economics (China, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and six Latin American countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) during the period 1985-2000.3
The choice of the sample was primarily dictated by data availability, but it contains all
major countries in the two regions which were exposed to significant international capital
flows in the 1990s. There are notable differences among these countries in terms of the
‘official’ (de jure) exchange rate regime adapted during the study period, ranging from a
fixed rate (currency board) regime in Argentina to a ‘freely floating’ regimes in the
Philippines. But the available evidence on the actual exchange rate practices of these
countries (Corden 2002, Edwards 2000, Williamson and Mahar 1998) amply supports the
view that during most of the period under study all countries de facto maintained fixed
(but adjustable) exchange regimes, with the United States dollar as the key intervention
currency. Thus, our country sample provides a near laboratory setting for studying issues
involved in maintaining a fixed exchange rate commitment while averting real exchange
rate appreciation in face of high capital inflows.  
We could not think of a better subject for a paper in honor of Max Corden.
During the past four decades of his illustrious career he has made a notable contribution
to broadening our knowledge of the real exchange problem both through policy-oriented
work and, more importantly, through analytical research. Relating to the latter, starting
with his seminal 1960 paper, he has played a key role in developing and popularizing the
dependent economy model (recently renamed as ‘Salter-Swan-Corden-Dornbusch model’
by Corbo and Fisher 1995, p. 2863) which is the workhorse of policy-oriented research in
the sphere of macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries.
3 The original research plan for this paper aimed to cover a longer time period, from 1975-2000
with a view to undertaking a comparative analysis of the capital inflow boom in the 1990s and
with the previous boom during 1978-82. It was subsequently realized that the two episodes
cannot be meaningfully analyzed with a unified framework because the previous episode was
markedly different from the latter episode in terms of the international environment, type of
flows, economic structures of the recipient countries and policy responses. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a comparative overview
of trends and patterns of capital inflows to the two regions. Section 3 takes a first look at
the relationship between capital flows and the real exchange rate through an examination
of time-series plots. Section 4 undertakes an in-depth empirical analysis of the role of
capital flows among other variables impacting on the real exchange rate behavior, with
emphasis on similarities and differences between countries in the two regions. This
section proceeds in two steps. First, a single-equation model is formulated and estimated
to delineate the impact of capital inflows on the real exchange rate while controlling for
other relevant variables suggested by the theory. Second, the econometric estimates are
combined with data on the key variables for individual countries to make inferences
about the observed differences between the two regions. The key inferences are
summarized in the final section.
 
2. TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF CAPITAL INFLOW
The post-Second-World-War era has witnessed two major episodes of capital inflow
surges to developing countries. The first was associated with the petrodollar recycling
process following the oil price increases in the 1970s. The episode started in the second
half of the 1970s and lasted until the onset of the debt crisis is 1982 following the
Mexican debt moratorium.  The second episode, which is the focus of this paper, began in
the latter half of the 1980s and gathered momentum in the first half of the 1990s, with
total net inflows to developing countries and flows to many individual countries
surpassing the early-1980s peaks by 1994. The flows slowed following the Mexican
crisis in late 1994 and plummeted following the onset of the Asian crisis in the second
half of 1997. Unlike the previous boom, which was propelled predominantly by a once-
and-for all event, the boom of the 1990s has been the outcome of pull-factors – those
related to better opportunities in the recipient countries – and push factors – those related
to lower interest rates and slowdown in economic activity in industrial countries. Some of
these factors (for instance global asset diversification of pension funds in developed
countries, rapid internationalization of production in high-tech industries, domestic
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market reforms in developing countries) are of long-term nature in their effect.4 Thus,
the indications are that large capital flows are here to stay as an important global
economic phenomenon.
Net private capital flows to the emerging markets (developing countries
and transition economies) increased from an annual average of less the US $10 billion in
the latter half of 1980s to nearly US $200 billion by the mid-1990s (Figure 1).5 Of total
annual flows to these countries during 1990-1997, almost three-fourths were absorbed by
countries in Asia and Latin America. In the early 1990s, total flows to Asia and Latin
America were roughly similar in magnitude, but during 1993-1996 inflows to Asia
surpassed those to Latin America by a wide margin.  
Insert Figure 1 about here
The decline in flows caused by the Mexican crisis in 1994 was by and
large confined to Mexico and Argentina. Thanks to the swift actions under the IMF-US
Treasury deal, its repercussion on Asia (and the rest of the world) was minimal. Total
flows to both regions expanded well into 1997. However, the repercussions of the Asia
crisis on global capital mobility was much more dramatic. Total flows to Asia plummeted
from US$114 billion in 1996 to US$19 billion in 1997 and contracted by a staggering
US$55 billion in 1998, and net inflows to the region remained virtually zero until 2001.6
Reflecting the global reverberation of the Asian crisis (which was subsequently amplified
by the Russian and Brazilian crises) total flows to Latin America declined from US$68
4 Relative importance of the pull and push factors has been extensively debated in the literature.
See for instance Corbo and Hernandez 2000 and the works referred to therein. 
5 Data on total capital flows (public + private) covering the entire period and with required
disaggreation are not readily available. But private capital flows depicted in Figure 1 provide an
accurate picture of the trends in total capital flows because net public flows dwindled from about
the late-1980s reaching less than US$ 10 billion (less than 5% of total annual flows) by the
mid-1990s.
6 In the five crisis-affected countries in Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea and the
Philippines) the turnaround in capital flows during 1996-97 amounted to US$105 billions, more
than 10% of the combined GDP of these combined economies.
6
billion to US$ 39 billion in 2000, arguably a much less dramatic decline in the
circumstances.
During the 1977-82 episode, bank loans (and other related flows)
accounted for the bulk (over three-fourths) of net inflows to the developing countries. By
contrast foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment have dominated net
flows in the 1990s. FDI has however been relatively more important in net flows to Asia
compared to Latin America. 
Table 1 provides summary data on total net capital flows to the 14
countries under study, distinguishing between three types of flows; foreign direct
investment (FDI), portfolio investment (investment in the form of transaction and debt
securities) and bank loans and other types of flows. The first two categories are
essentially private flows. The third category includes trade credit (both short term and
long term) and official capital flows (bilateral and multilateral loans and foreign aid).7   
Insert Table 1 about here
It is evident that, relative to the size of the economy, some of the Asian
countries experienced much larger capital inflows compared to their Latin American
counterparts. For instance, Malaysia absorbed inflows amounting to 10% of GDP in
1991, 15% in 1992, and more than 20% in 1993, averaging to 12% for the entire boom
period of 1989-96. The average annual inflows to Thailand and the Philippines also
exceeded 10% of GDP. None of the six Latin America countries experienced capital
inflows exceeding 10% of GDP.  
The Asian countries as a group received relatively higher share of inflows
in the form of FDI. However there were considerable differences in the FDI share among
the countries in the region. For instance South Korea was a net overseas foreign direct
investor throughout and total net inflows to that country predominantly took the form of
7 Ideally, we should disaggregate the third category into private and official flows, but required
data are available only for a few countries.
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portfolio capital and bank borrowing. The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia also
relied on bank borrowing to a significant extent, although FDI share in total flows to
these countries remained much larger compared to their Latin American counterparts.
FDI accounted for the overwhelming share of net flows to China and Malaysia. FDI
flows to Latin American countries (other than Chile) were basically related to
privatization of state-owned enterprises, whereas in Asia, particularly in East Asia, such
flows were in the form of green-field investment. There is also evidence that a relatively
higher share of FDI inflows to Latin America had gone to non-traded sectors
(construction and commercial services) and natural resource development, compared to
Asia. In Asia FDI was by and large in traded-good sectors, mostly in export-oriented
manufacturing (Ito 2000, Reisen 2000).
Finally, the data suggest that across the countries FDI flows have been less
volatile among the three different types of flows. In particular during the financial crises
in Mexico and the five Asian countries FDI flows showed remarkable stability in a
context where the other flows shifted sharply into the negative territory. Interestingly, net
FDI flows to South Korea and Thailand increased in the aftermaths of the currency
collapse, aided by the newly-gained competitiveness through currency depreciation and
liberalization of the FDI regimes as part of the crisis management strategy (Athukorala
2002). 
3. REAL EXCHANGE RATE-CAPITAL FLOW NEXUS: A FIRST LOOK
This section looks at the capital flows-real exchange nexus as a prelude to the
econometric analysis in the next section. The real exchange rate (RER) is measured here
as the ratio of export-weighted wholesale price index of trading partner countries
expressed in domestic currency relative to the domestic GDP deflator. The rationale
behind the choice of this particular measure among various proxy measures of RER is
discussed in the Appendix. In Figure 2, RER is plotted for each country together with net
capital inflow measured as a percentage of GDP (denoted CFW). In each graph, the
beginning and end of the capital inflow episode in the 1990s are demarcated with vertical
lines.  In Table 2, the data are summarised for the capital inflows episodes in the 1990s.
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Insert Figure 2 about here
Insert Table 2 about here
The general observation that the degree of RER appreciation associated
with capital inflow is uniformly much higher in Latin American countries compared to
their Asian counterparts is clearly borne out by this comparison. Focusing on the capital
inflow episodes (Figure 2), the real exchange rate appreciated by almost 43.5% in
Argentina during its early-1990s capital inflow episode, compared to the three preceding
years (Table 2). The rates of appreciation for the other five countries ranged between
14.7% (Brazil) to 33.8% (Mexico). Among the Asian countries, only the Philippines
experienced a rate of appreciation that comes closer to the average level for the Latin
American countries. The degrees of appreciation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand and the Philippines were rather mild, ranging from 2.3% to 11.2%. In India
and China, the real exchange continued to depreciate (rather than appreciate) during their
inflow episode. In India, capital inflows occurred against the backdrop of a significant
structural adjustment reform. Discretionary devaluation as part of this reform package
seems to have offset the impact of capital inflows.8 In early 1994 China decisively
reformed its exchange rate mechanism resulting in a real depreciation of the Yuan by
17% over the previous year, placing the country in a position of strength to withstand
massive capital inflows in the subsequent years. The average degree of depreciation
reported in Table 2 must therefore be viewed in the context of this successful, early
exchange rate adjustment (Athukorala and Warr 2002, p. 50).
8 In any case, thought the post-war era capital inflow to India had been small relative to the size
of the economy (Athreye and Kapur 2001).
.
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4. REAL EXCHANGE RATE-CAPITAL FLOW NEXUS: EMPIRICAL ALYSIS
In the previous section we observed that, although there was considerable inter-country
variations in the relationship between capital inflow and changes in the real exchange rate
among the countries under study, the six Latin American countries experienced a
uniformly higher degree of real exchange rate appreciation associated with capital
inflows compared to Asian countries. In this section we proceed to probe these
similarities and differences in two steps. First a single-equation model is developed and
estimated using pooled time-series data for the fifteen countries to delineate the like
between the real exchange rate and capital inflows while controlling for other factors.
Second parameter estimates of the model are combined with data on the key explanatory
variables to explain inter-group and inter-country differences.
Our model aims to explain the behavior of RER in terms of capital inflows
(disaggregated into foreign direct investment (FDI) and other capital flows (OCFW)9,
both measured relative to GDP) and a set of macroeconomic indicators chosen to
represent policies implemented to compensate for the real exchange rate effect of capital
flows. The postulated relationships between the dependent variables and the real
exchange rate are firmly rooted in the Salter-Swan-Corden-Dornbush model.10 
Previous studies of real exchange determination in developing countries
have used capital flows as an aggregate variable encompassing all forms of flows.11
There are however strong reasons for hypothesizing that the degree of real exchange rate
appreciation associated with a given level of FDI inflows tends be smaller in magnitude
compared to other flows, in particular portfolio flows and bank lending (Ito 2000, Resin
2000, Lipsey 2000). Compared to other flows, FDI in developing countries has a general
9 OCFW covers both private and public flows. Data are not available for most of the countries
under study to treat them  separately.
10 We do not intend to spell-out the dependent economy model here for want of space. The
interested reader is referred to Corden 1994, Chapter 1, which contains perhaps the best, non-
technical exposition of the model.
11 Edwards and Savastano (2000) provide a comprehensive survey of various studies of real
exchange rate determination (pp.488-90 and Table 13.5).
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tendency to concentrate more in traded goods sectors. Moreover with the on-going
process of transformation in international production and rapid economic opening in
investment receiving (host) countries there has been a significant increase of FDI
participation in export-oriented production. This is particularly so in the East Asian
countries in our country sample (Ito 2000). Thus the pressure on non-traded goods prices
resulting from FDI-related activities is presumably lower compared to that arising from
the other forms of capital inflow. Moreover, FDI is also not as volatile as the other short-
term flows. Therefore any possible ratchet (lingering) effect on the real exchange rate
resulting from upswings in inflows is likely to be less important in the case of FDI. For
these reasons we treat FDI and other capital inflows as two separate variables in our
analysis and assume the effect of the former to be smaller in magnitude compared to that
of the latter.
The attractiveness of a given country for FDI depends crucially on the
general investment climate, which primarily reflects the cumulative outcome of economic
policy reforms (Calvo et al., 1996, Feenstra 2000, Corbo and Hernandez 2000). However
there is evidence that the composition of capital inflows can also be tilted in favor of FDI
(and other long-term flows) through policies specifically aimed at discouraging short-
term flows. The most cited evidence of such policy engineered compositional shift
comes from Chile and Colombia.12 There is also evidence from China and Malaysia13 that
the government can intervene in short-term flows and still provide a hospitable
environment for FDI (Corden 2002, Stiglitz 2000, Athukorala 2001, Garnaut 1999). The
disaggregated treatment of capital flows in our analysis should help understand whether
such policy-induced shift in the composition of capital inflows can help ameliorate the
effect of total inflows on the real exchange rate.
12
 See Larian 2000, pp. 11-12 and the work cited therein.   Note that here we refer to composition
shift, rather than the total volume, of capital inflows. Whether the Chilean and Colombian
capital controls have had any dampening effect on the volume of inflow still remains a
controversial issue (Edwards 2000). 
13 Here we refer to the controls introduced by the Malaysian authorities on short-term capital
inflows in 1994.    The Malaysia capital controls introduced in 1998 were on outflows and are not
relevant to the discussion here.
11
The options open to policy makers to cushion the real exchange rate against
pressure of appreciation arising from capital inflows under a fixed exchange rate are of
three types. These are fiscal contraction, sterilizing foreign exchange market
interventions and nominal exchange rate adjustment. In our model each of these policy
stances are represented respectively by government expenditure (relative to GDP)
(GEXP), excess growth in money supply (M2) measured as the difference between
growth in M2 and real GDP growth (EXMG)14, and change in the nominal exchange rate
(DNER). 
In the context of an investment boom funded by capital inflows, fiscal contraction
can act as an effective stabilizer in moderating the real exchange rate effect of capital
inflow boom. The absorption of capital inflows would increase demand for domestic
goods and the fiscal contraction would reduce it. In addition to this general demand
contraction effect, reduction in government expenditure can have a favorable switching
effect because government expenditure tends to be spent more on non-tradables, unlike
private consumption.   
The measure widely used to represent a fiscal policy stance in this type of
analyses is the budgetary balance (measured as a ratio of GDP). But we believe that
government expenditure is a superior indicator because in the context of an economic
boom a country could well experience a ‘revenue surplus’, a reflection of a faster revenue
growth compared to expenditure growth. Meaningful deficit comparison across countries
should correct for such biases. Another problem with published data on budget deficits is
that different definitions of taxation and borrowing can heavily skew the measured deficit
(Sachs 1985).
When foreign capital flows into a country that has a fixed exchange rate
commitment, the central bank is naturally forced to purchase excessive flows (that is
build up its foreign exchange reserves) in order to maintain the ‘desired’ level of stability
in the nominal exchange rate. However, the mere purchase of foreign currency (non-
14 This measure assumes that money demand has a unitary elasticity with respect to the real
income.
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sterilized intervention) is not going to solve the problem. The increase in domestic money
base (of which foreign reserves are a part) results in increase in domestic money supply,
fuelling domestic inflation and appreciating the real exchange rate. But the central bank,
could at least for a time, offset this effect by combining reserve accumulation through
foreign exchange market intervention with the open market sale of bonds or other
monetary action to reduce domestic credit expansion. The variable EXMG is included in
the model to test the effectiveness of such sterilized intervention in averting real
exchange rate appreciation.  
Sterilized intervention is a useful policy that can provide some short-term relief in
the context of excessive capital inflow. But to the extent that sterilization drives short-
term interest rates higher, it may perpetrate excess capital inflows and real appreciation.
This is going to be a particularly binding constraint if FDI and other long-term inflows
account for a large share of total inflows. In such a case, one-to-one sterilization will
likely increase the short-term interest rate leading to an increase in short-term capital (Ito
2000). Another important problem with sterilized intervention, particularly raised in the
Latin American context, relates to the alleged fiscal cost; domestic market intervention of
the Central Bank involves paying a higher interest rate than what is earned on
accumulated foreign reserves, which are usually invested in low-yielding short-term
securities (Calvo 1991). When such costs build up authorities are naturally forced to
backtrack from their policy commitment to support the currency. For these reasons,
sterilized intervention is generally considered a far less effective policy instrument
compared to fiscal contraction in averting the problem of real exchange rate appreciation
in face of large capital inflows. 
The third policy instrument considered here is nominal exchange rate adjustment.
Within the boundaries set by the particular exchange rate regime chosen, countries have
the ability to take steps to correct from time to time the disequilibria in the fixed (but
adjustable) nominal rate against the intervention currency (US$). Such exchange rate
practice has been referred to in the literature as one of the contributory factors for the
success of East Asian countries to maintain the real exchange rate at realistic levels
(Garnaut 1999, Krueger 1997, Reisin 2000). To test the effectiveness of such nominal
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exchange rate adjustment, we use the annual changes in the nominal exchange rate
(DNER) as an explanatory variable.
In addition to the above variables, we use openness to trade (OPEN) as another
variable. Previous studies on real exchange rate determination in developing countries
have found this to be a significant explanatory variable (Edwards and Savastano 2001,
Table 13). The underlying hypothesis is that, other things remaining unchanged, greater
openness to trade tends to avert undue pressure for the appreciation of the real exchange
rate. There is no unique measure of openness. Among the available alternatives, we use
the Sachs-Warner binary index that takes value 1 for an open trade regime and zero
otherwise (Sachs and Warner 1995).15
Based on the above discussion, the real exchange rate function for the ensuing
empirical analysis can be specified as,
RER = ƒ(FDI, OCFW, EXMG, GEXP, DNER, OPEN, LA*OCFW, LA*FDI,LA*EXMG,
LA*GEXP,  LA*DNER,  LA*OPEN )
(1)
The dependent variable (RER) is the real exchange rate index (as defined in the
Appendix). An increase (decrease) in RER indicates real depreciation (appreciation). The
independent variables are given below (with the signs expected for the regression
coefficients in parentheses): 
15 Sachs and Warner (1995) employ the following criteria Sachs-Warner (1995) employ the
following policy criteria to distinguish countries with closed (inward-oriented) policy regimes
from those with open (outward-oriented) policy regimes:(i) Non-tariff barrier coverage of
intermediate and capital goods imports of 40 per cent or more; (ii) an average tariff on
intermediate and capital goods imports of 40% or more; (iii) A black market exchange rate that is
depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official exchange rate; (iv) A socialist economic
system and (v) state monopoly on major exports. The trade policy regime of a given
country/year is identified as open if none of the above five conditions is applicable. Alternative
regression estimates based on two other widely-used alternative measures of openness  the
black market exchange rate premium and the ratio of total merchandise trade (imports + exports)
to GDP in traded-goods sectors (GDP net of services, construction and utilities)  produced
virtually similar results.
14
FDI ( - ) Foreign direct investment 
OCFW ( - ) Capital inflow excluding FDI
EXMG (- ) Excess money growth 
GEXP (-) Government expenditure
DNER (+) Change in nominal bilateral exchange rate against the US dollar.
OPEN  (+) Openness  
and the remaining variables are the counterpart slope dummy variables for Latin America
(LA), where LA takes value 1 for Latin American countries and 0 for the other (Asian)
countries. These dummy interaction terms serve to test whether the magnitude of the
each regression coefficient for Latin American countries as a group differs significantly
from the estimate for the overall country sample. 
The model is estimated using pooled annual data for the fourteen countries over
the period 1985 to 2000.16 In addition to the variables mentioned above, we also included
country-specific intercept dummies (with Thailand as the base dummy) to allow for
country-specific fixed effects. For the purpose of estimation, all variables are used in
natural logarithms17 so that the estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as
elasticities. Pre-testing of the explanatory variables for endogeneity (using the Wu-
Hausman procedure) suggested that RER and OCFW are jointly determined, or more
precisely, OCFW is positively correlated with the error term of the equation. We
therefore estimated the equation using Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS),
instrumentalizing that variable.18
16 The data series on OCFW and FDI were compiled from the International Financial Statistics
database of the IMF. All other data series comes from the World Development Indicators
database of the World Bank.
17 RER is directly converted into logarithms and DNER in measured as annual differences in
logarithms. The remaining variables are first measured as ratio of GDP and converted into
logarithm as ln (1 + X).
18 The instruments were LIBOR, real OECD GDP, a time variable, GDP growth, gross domestic
fixed capital formation (relative to GDP), lagged dependent variable, current and lagged values
of other explanatory variables and country intercept dummies.
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The estimated full model is reported as Equation 1 in Table 3. In this equation,
coefficients attached to three explanatory variables - EXMS, LA*EXMS and LA*GEXP –
are not statistically significant. The model estimated after dropping these variables is
reported as Equation 2.19 To facilitate the interpretation of the results, a summary of the
variables used in the regressions is presented in Table.  4.
Insert Table 3 about here
Insert Table 4 about here
Both equations pass the standard F test for overall significance at the one percent
level. The overall fit ( R 2 ) is highly satisfactory for an econometric exercise based on
pooled cross-country data. The equations also comfortably pass the standard diagnostic
tests for functional form specification (RESET), normality (JBN) and heteroskedasticity
(ARCH). The specification of the first-stage regression in instrumental variable
estimation (IV) is amply supported by the Sargan’s test. The following discussion is
based on Equation 2, which is our preferred model.  
Let us first consider the results for the two capital inflow variables (OCFW and
FDI). For all countries on average one percent increase in OCFW brings about 0.56
percent appreciation in the real exchange rate. By contract, FDI inflows are associated
with depreciation (rather than appreciation)of the real exchange. The results for the
respective slope dummy variables (LA*OCFW and LA*FDI), however, suggest that the
magnitudes of these elasticities for the Latin American country sub-group differ
significantly from these overall estimates. In Latin America a one percent increase in
OCFW brings about, on average, 1.7 percent appreciation in the real exchange rate. The
degree of depreciation associated with a one percent increase in FDI flow is much smaller
(0.06 per cent) for the region compared that for the entire country sample (0.56 per cent).
These estimates yield two important inferences. First, in both regions ‘the real exchange
rate problem’ is a phenomenon specifically associated with ‘other’ capital flows
(OCFW). Second, these flows have a greater dampening impact on the real exchange in
19 This specification choice was amply supported by the Wald test for joint variable deletion.
The coefficient estimates of the remaining variables are remarkably robust to the deletion of
these three variables.   
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Latin America compared to that in Asia. At least part of the explanation for this
difference may be rooted in differences in the macroeconomic policy histories of the two
regions.20 For instance, given the proven track record of maintaining macroeconomic
stability, it is likely that the pressure on non-tradable prices resulting from resources
transfers to the Asian countries is counterbalanced by an increase in domestic saving and
investment. 
Why FDI inflows tend to depreciate (rather than appreciate) real exchange rate is
an interesting issue which requires further investigation. However, we believe that this
result is consistent with our hypothesis that FDI generally tends to have a more tradable
bias compared to the other types of capital flows. The lower magnitude of the measured
relationship for Latin America may reflect differences in the output composition of FDI-
related activities in the two regions; as noted in Section 2 there is evidence that FDI-
related activities in Latin America have a greater non-tradable bias.
The coefficient attached to GEXP is uniformly applicable to both regions as the
coefficient on the slope dummy variable, LA*GEXP, is not statistically different from
zero. It suggests that a one percent contraction in government expenditure to GDP ratio
is associated with 3.17 per cent depreciate in the real exchange rate. Thus our results
support the theoretical proposition that fiscal contraction is a powerful cushion for all
countries against real exchange appreciation associated with capital inflows. This result
for GEXP when combined with the data on this variable for individual countries (Table 4)
provides a powerful explanation as to why the Asian countries experienced a rather mild
appreciation in the real exchange rate compared to the experience of their Latin
counterparts. In the former countries government expenditure has remained flat or even
declined during the period of the boom. In Malaysia and Thailand government
expenditure in relation to GDP declined in the wake of capital influx in the early 1990s.
In Latin America, all countries except Chile government expenditure increased, and
Brazil and Argentina recorded increases of more than four percentage points. The only
20 For details on macroeconomic policies and experiences see Corden (1996), Little et al. (1993)
and Edward (1995).
17
Asian country to record an increase in government expenditure during the boom is the
Philippines. 
As already noted, the excess money growth variable (EXMS) failed to yield a
statistically significant coefficient and the coefficient of the other variables were
remarkably resilient to its inclusion in (or exclusion from) the model. This result is
consistent with the widely held views about the impotence of sterilized intervention as a
policy tool in averting real exchange rate appreciation in face of high capital inflows.  
Finally, the results for DNER suggest, on average one percentage point
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate change translates in to 0.5 per cent
depreciation in the real exchange rate. However, the coefficient estimate for the related
slope dummy variable (LA*DNER) suggests that the impact is rather small (0.05 per cent)
for the for Latin American countries. These results are consistent with the view that the
Asian countries have been more successful in averting real exchange rate appreciation
through nominal exchange rate adjustment, compared to the Latin American countries
(Little et al. 1993, Corden 1996, Reisen 2000). The explanation seems to lie in well-
known wage-price rigidities, in particular wage indexation, in the latter countries which
serve to quickly dissipate the impact of nominal exchange rate depreciation (Little et al.
1993, Chapter 7).
5. CONCLUSION
In the 1990s, the major capital-importing countries in Asia have managed to cope far
better with the real exchange problem associated with capital flows compared to their
Latin American counterparts. The degree of real exchange rate appreciation associated
with capital inflows was uniformly much lower in the Asian countries, despite the fact
that some of these countries experienced far greater foreign capital inflows relative to the
size of their economies. According to the results of our empirical analysis the
explanation of these differences seems to lie in both country specific factors (as reflected
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in differences in the coefficients in the real exchange rate function) and policy differences
(as reflected in the levels of the relevant explanatory variables).
Our econometric results suggest that the composition of capital flows matters in
determining their impact on the real exchange rate. ‘The real exchange rate problem’ is a
phenomenon predominantly associated with ‘other’ capital flows (OCFW) and FDI
seems to have a salutary effect on the real exchange rate. Moreover, due perhaps to the
legacy of a traumatic macroeconomic policy history, a given level of OCFW brings about
a far greater degree of appreciation of the real exchange in Latin America compared to
Asia. This difference in the magnitude of the observed relationship, coupled with the
greater importance of OCFW in total capital flows to Latin American countries, seem to
go a long way in expanding the relatively higher degree of real exchange rate
appreciation experienced by these countries compared to their Asian counterparts. 
Among the policy variables considered, fiscal contraction seems to have been
used more effectively by the Asian countries to cushion the real exchange rate against the
appreciation pressure of capital inflows. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that
sterilized intervention can generate a lasting impact on the real exchange rate. Finally,
nominal exchange rate change seems to have a significant lasting effect on the real
exchange rate only in Asian countries. Due perhaps to wage-price rigidities, the impact
of a given nominal exchange rate change seems to dissipate quickly in Latin American
countries. 
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APPENDIX
MEASUREMENT OF THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
The real exchange rate (RER) is the price of traded goods relative to the price of non-
traded (domestic) goods. In the absence of readily available indices of tradable and non-
tradable prices, the real exchange rate has to be proxied by available domestic and world
price indices and nominal exchange rates. There is no unique way of constructing a proxy
measure, but all commonly used measures compute the ratio,
RER   NER P
W
P D
 
where NER denotes the nominal exchange rate (measured as domestic currency per
foreign currency), PW is an index of foreign prices and PD  is an index of domestic prices.
NER and PW are weighted averages computed across trading partner countries. The
country weights may be based on export shares, import shares or, most commonly, shares
based on the sum of exports and imports, although the latter has no apparent theoretical
foundation. 
The particular measure used differs according to the measures used for PW and
PD. Our preferred proxy measure makes use of foreign producer (wholesale) prices for
PW and domestic GDP deflator for PD.. Country weights based on export shares are used
in the construction of NER and PW series.21 By construction, the producer price index is
dominated by the prices of tradables much more than the GDP deflator. The index may
thus serve as a rough proxy for the theoretical concept of the real exchange rate - the
relative prices of tradable to non-tradable goods. A convenient alternative to GDP
deflator as the domestic price measure in constructing the index is the consumer price
index (CPI) (Edwards 1989, Athukorala and Warr 2002). Our preferred choice is the
21 For a discussion on the conceptual basis for using export weights (rather than commonly-used
trade (export + import) weights) see Warr (1986).
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former, for two reasons. Firstly, GDP deflator provides a much broader, economy-wide
coverage of price changes compared to CPI. Second, and perhaps more importantly, in
most countries CPI, being a ‘politically visible’ economic indicator, is susceptible to
manipulation.22
 
Most of the previous studies have typically used either of two other indicators,
although the theoretical reasoning behind the particular measurement choice is seldom
made explicit. One, which is perhaps the most widely used, particularly in publications
of the IMF and the World Bank, uses a trade-weighted index of consumer prices in
trading partner countries for PW and an index of consumer prices in the given country for
PD . The use of this indicator as a proxy for the theoretical concept of a real exchange
rate for developing countries is usually justified on the premise that under the low
inflation conditions that prevail in developed countries (which are generally the major
trading partners), producer prices and consumer prices tend to move together (Edwards
1989). The other is the J.P. Morgan index, which uses wholesale non-food manufacturing
prices for both world and domestic prices. This measure may thus be viewed as an
indicator of the international competitiveness of manufacturing goods produced in the
given country. It is not a measure of internal competitiveness (the relative profitability of
domestic production of tradables compared with non-traded goods and services), the
concept of real exchange rate, which is theoretically more appropriate for the present
analysis. Wholesale prices of traded goods generally adjust to exchange rate changes and
the dismantling of trade barriers and are thus likely to deviate from the price trends of
non-traded goods.
22
  We owe this point to Richard Cooper.
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Table 1:  Net Capital Inflow1  to Selected Asian and Latin American Countries:
1985-1999   (Percent of GDP)-  
1985-8
92
1990-9
42 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(a)   Asia
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China 1.71 1.02 2.98 2.98 -0.12 -2.62 -0.71
      FDI 0.51 2.56 4.83 4.63 4.61 4.26 3.73
      Portfolio investment 0.41 0.23 0.11 0.21 0.77 -0.39 -1.13
      Bank loans and other 0.99 -0.24 0.58 0.02 -3.06 -4.53 -1.83
India 2.14 2.25 1.33 2.58 1.99 2.33 2.08
      FDI 0.00 0.12 0.56 0.57 0.83 0.61 0.46
      Portfolio investment 0.00 0.47 0.44 1.03 0.61 -0.14 0.51
      Bank loans and other 2.12 1.52 0.07 1.48 0.87 1.54 1.04
Indonesia 2.53 3.26 3.96 5.35 -1.51 -6.22 -2.70
      FDI 0.49 1.06 1.85 2.46 2.09 -0.32 -2.00
      Portfolio investment -0.02 0.64 2.03 2.20 -1.22 -1.50 -1.27
      Bank loans and other 2.87 2.01 1.19 0.11 -1.14 -5.88 -0.94
Korea -2.63 1.57 3.18 4.69 -3.11 -4.61 2.16
      FDI -0.11 -0.20 -0.36 -0.45 -0.34 0.21 1.26
      Portfolio investment 0.08 1.50 2.39 2.90 3.02 -0.39 2.26
      Bank loans and other -2.48 0.45 1.40 2.03 -4.74 -2.48 -0.49
Malaysia 0.51 11.11 7.75 6.92 2.06 0.67 -10.03
      FDI 2.33 7.10 4.70 5.04 5.13 2.98 1.97
      Portfolio investment 1.04 -1.08 -0.49 -0.27 -0.25 0.39 1.02
      Bank loans and other -2.83 3.51 4.39 4.63 -2.69 -6.89 -11.40
Philippines 2.31 6.32 4.34 10.01 1.53 -0.41 -5.55
      FDI 1.04 1.28 1.46 1.61 1.32 3.25 0.57
      Portfolio investment 0.18 0.11 1.61 6.42 0.72 -1.42 6.28
      Bank loans and other 0.22 4.84 4.10 5.58 5.87 -1.09 -8.08
Singapore 2.66 0.37 -7.00 -7.12 -9.48 -21.82 -20.08
      FDI 9.34 6.35 1.11 2.24 -0.82 8.48 3.58
      Portfolio investment -0.45 -3.91 -8.82 -12.07 -13.65 -9.48 -8.34
      Bank loans and other -6.54 -1.41 1.95 3.98 0.29 -25.02 -15.91
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Table 1 (continued)
-9.13
Thailand 5.04 9.94 12.31 9.24 -10.08 -15.14 4.85
      FDI 1.11 1.64 0.70 0.77 2.32 6.42
      Portfolio investment 1.17 1.35 2.43 1.94 3.00 0.32 0.06
      Bank loans and other 1.95 6.59 9.89 7.97 -13.39 -19.51 -14.06
(b)    Latin America
Argentina -1.99 2.32 1.04 3.59 5.38 6.30 5.11
      FDI 0.76 1.18 1.59 1.96 1.88 1.66 8.09
      Portfolio investment -0.74 3.70 0.72 3.61 3.52 2.94 -2.28
      Bank loans and other -1.83 -2.47 -0.54 -1.40 0.30 1.74 -0.36
Brazil -4.85 7.51 3.90 8.77 9.18 2.74 -1.00
      FDI 3.10 2.02 3.40 5.06 4.46 2.52 6.45
      Portfolio investment -0.04 1.25 0.05 1.60 3.15 -1.13 0.19
      Bank loans and other -7.82 4.10 0.24 3.06 2.17 2.97 -7.87
Chile -4.85 7.51 3.90 8.77 9.18 2.74 -1.00
      FDI 3.10 2.02 3.40 5.06 4.46 2.52 6.45
      Portfolio investment -0.04 1.25 0.05 1.60 3.15 -1.13 0.19
      Bank loans and other -7.82 4.10 0.24 3.06 2.17 2.97 -7.87
Colombia 2.21 1.87 4.96 6.67 5.76 3.86 -0.29
      FDI 1.47 1.37 0.77 2.87 4.53 2.46 1.17
      Portfolio investment 0.13 0.32 1.55 1.71 0.85 1.83 -0.89
      Bank loans and other 1.06 -0.06 2.52 1.99 1.20 0.02 -0.39
Mexico -0.35 -5.66 -0.55 -0.70 -1.86 -3.73 -2.92
      FDI 1.20 1.53 3.33 2.76 3.20 2.69 2.46
      Portfolio investment -0.45 3.42 -3.63 4.20 1.08 -0.32 2.07
      Bank loans and other -1.41 1.50 -3.37 -5.12 0.52 2.04 -0.82
Peru -5.34 2.06 6.59 7.70 8.87 3.99 1.85
      FDI 0.08 1.79 3.89 5.82 2.88 3.30 3.79
      Portfolio investment 0.00 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.26 -0.61 -0.72
      Bank loans and other -3.74 -1.34 1.48 -0.07 6.21 0.14 -1.87
Note:
1. Including errors and omissions.
2. Annual average.
Source:  Compiled from   IMF, International Financial Statistics database.  
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Table 2: Capital Inflow Episodes of Selected Asian and Latin American Countries:
Timing, Cumulative Change in Inflows, Maximum Annual Inflow and Change in
Real Exchange Rate (RER). 
Capital Inflow
episode1
Change in net
capital inflow2
(% of GDP)
Maximum
annual inflows
during the
episode
Change in
RER2, 3
(%)
Asia
China, PR 1993-96 5.0 4.4 6.8
India 1991-94 0.6 3.8 22.0
Indonesia 1990-96 1.6 5.4 -8.1
Korea, Rep. of 1990-96 5.5 4.7 -7.4
Malaysia 1989-96 5.7 21.4 -6.9
Philippines 1989-96 4.8 10.0 -11.2
Singapore 1987-92 7.1 5.8 -2.3
Thailand 1987-95 9.1 12.4 -5.5
Latin America
Argentina 1990-93 8.8 8.1 -43.5
Brazil 1992-96 3.9 4.4 -14.7
Chile 1989-97 5.6 9.3 -18.6
Colombia 1992-96 3.9 6.7 -18.1
Mexico 1989-93 6.9 7.8 -33.8
Peru 1992-97 9.0 8.8 -19.7
Notes
1. The period during which the economy experienced a significant surge in net capital inflows.
2. Percentage change in average net capital inflow to GDP ratio during the episode from the
average for the three proceeding years. 
3. Percentage change in the average RER (1990=100) during the episode relative to the average
for the three preceding years.  A decrease in the index denotes appreciation.
Source:  As for Table 2.
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Table 3:  Determinants of The Real Exchange Rate in Selected Asian and Latin
American Countries*      (Dependent variable = `RER )
Equation 1 Equation 2
Variable2 Parameter (t-ratio) Parameter  (t-ratio)
Constant + 4.72  (41.96)*** + 4.71  (56.22)***
Foreign direct investment (FDI) + 0.32  (3.40)*** +0.29  (3.35)***
Capital inflow excluding FDI  (OCFW) -0.55    (2.50)* -0.56 (2.60)**
Excess money growth (EXMS) -0. 18   (0.84)
Government expenditure (GEXP) -3.18    (3.14)*** - 3.17    (5.53)***
Change in nominal exchange rate (DNER) +0.61    (2.50)** +0.50  (2.48)**
Openness  (OPEN) +0.15    (2.67)** +0.15  (2.62)**
Slope dummy variables for Latin America (LA)
      LA*OCFW -1.16    (2.91)*** -1.14  (2.95)***
     LA*FDI -0.54    (3.37)*** -0.52   (3.35)***
     LA*EXMS -0.19   (0.83)
     LA*GEXP -0.05    (0.04)
     LA*DNER -0.56    (2.08)** -0.45  (2.18)**
     LA*OPEN -0.18    (2.42)** -0.18  (2.49)**
N 224 224
R 2 0.50 0.52
F 9.91 11.35
SE 0.14 0.14
SIV  χ2 (11) 132.35*** 131.46***
RESET - χ2 (1) 0.10*** 0.09***
JBN, χ2- (2) 3.26*** 3.2***
ARCH - χ2 (1) 0.88*** 0.83***
Notes
* Country intercept dummies are not reported. The figure in parentheses underneath each
coefficient is the t-ratio of the coefficient. The level of statistical significance denoted as:
* = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1%.
Test Statistics  
SE Standard error of the regression.
SIV     Sargan’s general test of misspecification in instrumental variable (IV) estimation..
RESET  Ramsey test for functional form miss-specification. 
JBN Jarque-Bera test for the normality of residuals.
ARCH Engle's autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity test..
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Table 4:  Change in Explanatory Variable During the Capital Inflow Boom1
Compared to the Mean Level for the Sample Period (1985-2000) 
 
FDI  
(% of GDP)
OCFW 
(% of GDP)
GEXP  
(% of GDP) DNER  
(Annual change %
)
Asia2 1.1 4.3 -0.5 -3.4
China (1993-96) 3.8 0.4 -0.6 -1.5
India (1991-94) -3.4 0.2 0.4 -0.7
Indonesia (1990-96) 0.8 2.2 -1.0 -9.6
Korea (1990-96) -0.5 6.3 0.2 4.2
Malaysia (1989-96) 4.5 6.3 -2.3 -4.7
Philippines (1989-96) 0.1 5.8 1.9 -4.0
Singapore (1987-92) 2.1 5.0 -0.9 -5.8
Thailand (1987-95) 1.0 8.0 -1.6 -4.8
Latin America2 0.7 7.5 0.9 -41.4
Argentina (1990-93) 0.0 8.8 2.6 -102.3
Brazil (1992-96) 0.3 3.7 0.8 -11.0
Chile (1989-97) -0.2 14.1 -1.3 -8.9
Colombia (1992-96) 0.1 3.8 2.3 -6.6
Mexico (1989-93) 0.3 6.4 1.9 -29.1
Peru (1992-97) 3.5 5.5 1.5 -124.5
Notes
1. Capital inflow boom is given in brackets net to the country name in column 1.
2. Simple average for the listed countries.
Source:  See Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Net Private Capital Flows to Asia and Latin America 
(billion of US dollars)
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Figure 2: Net Capital Inflows (percentage of GDP) and the Real Exchange Rate
(1990=100) for selected Asian and Latin American countries (1985-2000) 
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(b) Latin America
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Note: * vertical lines denote the beginning and end of capital inflow episodes.  The correlation coefficient
estimated between change in RER and capital inflow (% of GDP): China = 0.25; India = 0.19; Indonesia
=-0.72; Korea = -0.75; Malaysia = 0.40; Philippines = -0.09; Singapore = -0.58; Thailand = 0.51;
Argentina = 0.83; Brazil = 0.65; Chile = 0.33; Colombia = 0.55; Mexico = 0.67; and Peru =  0.84.
Source : Based of data complied from IMF, International Financial Statistics database.  
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